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Finding A Better Way Around Employment At 
Will: Protecting Employees' Autonomy 
Interests Through Tort Law 
WILLIAM R. CORBETTt 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Bonnie O'Daniel was fired, ostensibly for posting to her 
Facebook page a photo of a man at a Target store wearing a 
dress and derisively commenting on his ability to use the 
same restroom or dressing room as her daughters.' The post 
allegedly offended her employer's president, a member of the 
LGBT community, and resulted in her termination. 2 She 
sued, asserting numerous claims, including reverse sex 
retaliation and violation of her right of freedom of expression 
under the Louisiana Constitution. 3 Her claims were 
t Frank L. Maraist and Wex S. Malone Professor of Law, Paul M. Hebert Law 
Center of Louisiana State University. I am grateful to Dean Thomas C. Galligan, 
Jr. and the LSU Law Center for a research grant. 
1. O'Daniel v. Indus. Serv. Sol., No. 17-190-RLB, 2018 WL 265585, at *1 
(M.D. La. Jan. 1, 2018), appeal filed, 18-30136 (5th Cir. Jan. 31, 2018). O'Daniel's 
post read: "So meet, ROBERTa! Shopping in the women's department for a 
swimsuit at the BR Target. For all of you people that say you don't care what 
bathroom it's using, you're full of shit!! Let this try to walk in the women's 
bathroom while my daughters are in there!! #hellwillfreezeoverfirst." Id. at *8 
n.1. 
2. Id. at *1. 
3. Id. at *1-2. 
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dismissed.4 
Renee Gork was a reporter for a Fayetteville radio 
station that covered University of Arkansas Razorback 
athletics.5 She was fired after wearing a Florida Gators cap 
to the press conference of University of Arkansas head 
football coach, Bobby Petrino.6 Coach Petrino commented on 
the cap.7 Ms. Gork got a job in Gainesville, Florida with a 
radio station owned by the University of Florida, which was 
her alma mater.8 Ms. Gork apparently did not sue her former 
employer. 
Janelle Perez, a police officer, was fired for having an 
extramarital affair with a fellow officer and sued her 
employer, the city of Roseville, California.9 A Ninth Circuit 
panel held that the officer was fired in violation of her 
constitutional rights to privacy and intimate association. 10 
It is debatable whether any of these three employees 
4. The court explained that the plaintiffs claim under the state constitution 
failed because the protections are the same as those in the First Amendment of 
the federal Constitution, and governmental action is required. To the extent the 
plaintiff was asserting a claim for wrongful discharge in violation of public policy, 
Louisiana does not recognize the tort theory. The court explained that the 
retaliation for sex was actually a claim based on oppositionto sexual orientation 
discrimination, and Title VH, under Fifth Circuit precedent, does not cover sexual 
orientation. Id. at *7. 
5. See, e.g., Caroline Howard, Renee Gork And What Not To Wear To Work, 
FORBES (Aug. 17, 2010, 8:44 PM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/carolinehoward 
/2010/08/1 7/renee-gork-and-what-not-to-wear-to-work/#4d9aaef22bf. 
6. Id. 
7. "And that will be the last question I answer with that hat on," Petrino 
said. Id. According to the radio station, Coach Petrino and the university played 
no role in its decision to fire Ms. Gork. Russell Goldman, Reporter Renee Gork 
Fired in Rival Team Cap Flap, ABC NEWS (Aug. 17, 2010), 
https://abcnews.go.com/Business/reporter-renee-gork-fired-rival-team-cap-flap/ 
story?id=11422213. 
8. Hat gets reporter fired - then hired, CNN (Oct. 4, 2010, 3:30 PM), 
http://www.wmcactionnews5.com/story/13323668/controversial-hat-costs-
reporter-her-job. 
9. Perez v. Cityof Roseville, 882 F.3d 843, 848-50 (9thCir. 2018). 
10. Id. at 854. 
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should recover damages from their former employers based 
on their terminations. The pertinent issue here is whether 
they even have a viable basis for asserting claims. Ms. 
O'Daniel and Ms. Gork did not have viable legal claims for 
their terminations because they were private-sector 
employees. Ms. Perez did have a colorable claim because she 
was a government employee. 
The cases are legion in which employees are terminated 
when employers attempt to regulate or oversee employees' 
conduct or expressions that the employees consider to be 
their own personal concerns. This area of employment law is 
often referred to as "privacy."" However, the better 
descriptive term for the diverse employee interests is 
"autonomy," meaning self-governance: "the right and ability 
to control one's own decisions and actions."1 2 The 
Restatement of Employment Law proposes protecting these 
interests when they are outside the employment relationship 
and do not affect the business. 13 It provides an illustrative 
list: engaging in lawful conduct outside of work; holding or 
expressing political, moral, ethical, religious, or other 
personal beliefs outside of work; and belonging to or 
participating in lawful associations when the membership or 
participation does not affect the employer.14 
Private-sector employees fired by their employers for 
pursuit of their autonomy interests have limited legal 
11. A leading treatise on the subject is entitled Privacy in Employment Law. 
MATTHEW W. FINKIN, PRIVACY IN EMPLOYMENT LAW ix-xx (3d ed. 2009). Perusal of 
the table of contents reveals the variety of topics covered: in part, medical 
screening and testing; drug, alcohol, and tobacco screening and testing; 
psychological screening and testing; monitoring employee performance and 
conduct; and control of employees (including various categories of association and 
expression). Id. at xxi-xxxvi. Thus, we amalgamate many diverse rights and 
interests within the term "privacy." 
12. Matthew T. Bodie, The Best Way Out Is Always Through: Changing the 
Employment At-Will Default Rule to Protect Personal Autonomy, 2017 U. ILL. L. 
REV. 223, 238 (2017). 
13. RESTATEMENT OF EMPLOYMENT LAW § 7.08 (AM. LAW INST. 2015). 
14. Id. 
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recourse. A couple of legal principles have stunted 
development of the legal protection accorded to employees' 
autonomy interests in the United States. The first is a matter 
of constitutional law. the First Amendment protections (for 
speech, expression, association, etc.) and the Fourth 
Amendment protections (prohibition of unreasonable search 
and seizure) are restrictions on government action. Thus, 
private-sector employers are not restricted in the absence of 
government action.15 The second is a matter of state 
termination law. forty-nine states in the nation adhere to the 
"doctrine" of employment at will, 1 6 pursuant to which 
employers, in the absence of a contractual or statutory 
restriction, may fire employees "for a good reason, a bad 
reason, or no reason at all."17 The result is that private sector 
employees can be disciplined or terminated for their conduct 
or expression without a remedy under circumstances in 
which public-sector employees might have a remedy for 
violation of their rights under the First or Fourth 
Amendments and analogous state constitutional provisions. 
The American Law Institute's Restatement of 
Employment Law18 adopts a position that would create 
increased protection of employees' autonomy rights by a 
modification of the employment-at-will presumption.1 9 The 
Restatement advocates carving out part of employment at 
will and replacing it with a default rule based on an implied 
contract term between the employer and employee. 20 Under 
15. Bodie, supra note 12, at 256. 
16. Montana abrogated employment at will by enacting, in 1987, the Montana 
Wrongful Discharge from Employment Act. MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 39-2-901 to -914. 
17. E.g., Engquist v. Oregon Dept. of Agric., 553 U.S. 591, 606 (2008); Payne 
v. W & Atl. R.R., 81 Tenn. 507, 518-20 (1884); Bodie, supra note 12, at 224-32. 
18. RESTATEMENT OF EMP'T LAw § 7.08. For a scholarly debate about the 
wisdom of undertaking the Restatement of Employment Law project, see U.C. 
Hastings Symposium on the Proposed Restatement of Employment Law, 13 EMP. 
RTS. & EMP. POL'Y J. 1 (2009). 
19. Bodie, supra note 12, at 265. 
20. RESTATEMENT OF EMP'T LAW, § 7.08 cmt. f. Autonomy as Default Rule 
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that rule, the employer could not lawfully fire the employee 
for conduct that does not occur in the context of the 
employment relationship and that does not have a 
significant impact on the employment relationship. 21 
Professor Matthew Bodie, a co-reporter on the Restatement, 
has written an important and provocative article in support 
of the Restatement position. 22 
I agree that private sector employees' autonomy 
interests merit greater protection and that the employment-
at-will doctrine is the salient legal tenet empowering 
employers to interfere with those interests. 23 I also agree 
that the common law offers an important and necessary 
vehicle for limiting employment at will and expanding 
protection of employees' autonomy interests. 2 4 However, I 
(stating "[t]he premise of this Section is that the parties to every employment 
relationship implicitly agree to the level of protection stated in the Section. This 
implied understanding may be altered by the parties' express agreement. To 
change this default rule, the parties would have to agree that off-duty lawful 
conduct, adherence to or expression of beliefs, or membership in lawful 
associations maybe the subject of the employer's adverse personnel action."). 
21. RESTATEMENT OF EMP'T LAw § 7.08. 
22. See generally Bodie, supra note 12. 
23. I will note, however, that modifying or limiting employment at will would 
leave employees susceptible to other adverse employment actions for exercising 
their autonomy. On the issue of whether the law should restrict employer 
interference by adverse employment actions other than termination, see infra 
note 96. 
24. There is a patchwork of federal, state, and local statutes that protect 
various aspects of employee autonomy, including the Electronic Communications 
Privacy Act (and Stored Communications Act), a plethora of whistleblower 
statutes, state off-duty activities statutes, and more. See, e.g., STEVEN L. 
WILLBORN ET. AL, EMPLOYMENT LAW: CASES & MATERIALS, at Part nI (6th ed. 
2017). A limitation of statutory protections, however, is that they often are very 
specific as to what activity they protect. More general and elastic protection can 
be achieved by common law protection. See, e.g., William R. Corbett, The Need 
for a Revitalized Common Law of the Workplace, 69 BROOKLYN L. REV. 91, 95-96, 
161-62 (2003); J. Wilson Parker, At-Will Employment and the Common Law: A 
Modest Proposal to De-Marginalize Employment Law, 81 IOWA L. REV. 347 (1995) 
(proposing that at-will be modified by common law adjustments). Furthermore, 
passage of significant legislative restrictions on employment at will is unlikely 
because of the lack of a strong lobby for it and the existence of a strong lobby 
against it. See Lawrence E. Blades, Employment at Will vs. Individual Freedom: 
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think the Restatement takes a less cogent and effective 
common law approach than it should have taken. Unlike the 
Restatement and Professor Bodie, I do not favor an implied 
contract term as the means to provide such protection. The 
better approach is by developing and expanding the tort of 
wrongful discharge in violation of public policy. I think the 
Restatement proposal, as explicated by Bodie, overestimates 
both the fit and promise of a contract approach and 
underestimates the fit and potential success of a tort 
approach. There are several reasons to believe that a tort 
approach would succeed where a contract approach would 
fail. Moreover, this is a matter of great societal importance-
not just a private matter between contracting parties. Tort 
law intervenes to declare societal judgments,25 to impose 
duties, and to effectuate those judgments, which the parties 
have not undertaken between themselves. 26 We need a 
proclamation of societal judgment and value that protection 
of employees' autonomy interests is important to a 
democratic society that recognizes the worth of employees as 
"full-fledged members of the community." 27 The tort of 
wrongful discharge in violation of public policy, although 
inadequate for the task in its current form, can be modified 
and fortified to fulfill this role. 
On Limiting the Abusive Exercise of Employer Power, 67 COLUM. L. REV. 1404, 
1434 (1967). 
25. Bodie, supra note 12, at 261. 
26. MatthewW. Finkin, Employee Privacy, American Values, and the Law, 72 
CHI.-KENT L. REV. 221, 223 (1996). 
27. Samuel R. Bagenstos, Employment Law and Social Equality, 112 MICH. 
L. REV. 225, 248 (2013) (quoting Robert C. Post, The Social Foundations of 
Privacy: Community and Self in the Common Law Tort, 77 CALIF. L. REV. 957, 
968 (1989)); see also FINKIN, supra note 11, at xxxix (asserting that autonomy and 
privacy play important roles in the formation and maintenance of self-identity 
and that to cease to bear such rights is to be dehumanized); cf. Cynthia Estlund, 
Rethinking Autocracy at Work, 131 HARv. L. REV. 795, 795 (2018) (reviewing 
ELIZABETH ANDERSON, PRIVATE GOVERNMENT: How EMPLOYERS RULE OUR LIVES 
(AND WHY WE DON'T TALK ABouT IT) (2017) (questioning "[h]ow is it that a 
democratic society devoted to individual freedom came to tolerate the private 
outposts of autocratic rule and unfreedom in which most citizens spend their 
working lives?")). 
2018] PROTECTING EMPLOYEES'AUTONOMY 1077 
II. PROBLEMS WITH THE RESTATEMENTBODIE 
CONTRACT APPROACH 
Professor Bodie acknowledges the tort approach as an 
alternative, but he advocates the contract approach as 
preferable because it "better matches with the at-will rule as 
well as the nuanced relationship between firms and 
employees." 28 Bodie thus urges change by working within 
contract doctrine despite the fact employment at will is a 
presumption regarding the terms of an employment contract. 
There are several problems with this proposal. First, 
employment at will, although merely a rebuttable 
presumption, has exerted an overwhelming influence on the 
law of contracts as applied in the context of employment. So 
profound has been that influence that the proposed implied 
contract term, contrary to Bodie's contention, does not 
necessarily better reflect the understanding and 
expectations of the parties. Second, proposing a change in 
contract doctrine within employment law does not bode well 
in light of the many ways that employment at will has 
distorted employment contract law. Third, the proposed 
criteria that limit the protected autonomy interests-outside 
of employment and not affecting the business-are of 
decreasing relevance with modern technology and the 
restructuring of jobs. Moreover, the limiting criteria and the 
affirmative defense established by the Restatement portend 
that employers would not be significantly restricted and 
would win most litigated cases. Finally, even if courts 
recognized the implied term, it is not clear how the law would 
prevent employers from requiring employees to sign it away 
as a condition of employment. 
Professor Bodie makes the case that the implied term 
better reflects the intent of employer and employee than the 
28. Bodie, supra note 12, at 227. I rely heavily on Professor Bodie's article for 
explanation of the rationale supporting the contract approach adopted by the 
Restatement and for explanation of the rationale for rejection of a tort approach. 
See generally id. 
1078 BUFFALO LAW REVIEW [Vol. 66 
current employment-at-will doctrine; that is, most employers 
and employees intend that the employer cannot fire an 
employee for a personal activity or expression outside of work 
that does not affect work or the employer. 29 Thus, according 
to Bodie, establishing a rebuttable presumption forbidding 
termination for exercises of personal autonomy accords with 
the law-and-economics theory of setting default rules 
according to what most parties would agree to if they 
bargained about the issue. 30 It is not clear, however, that this 
adjustment of the at-will presumption accords with what 
most employers and employees intend and would bargain to. 
Against the backdrop of roughly a century-and-a-half of 
employment at will dominance, 31 employers have become 
accustomed to the almost unbridled prerogative ceded to 
them under employment at will.32 Many employers, no doubt 
on advice of counsel, insert an at-will clause in a handbook, 
manual, or other writing and have new employees sign an 
acknowledgement. Employees are less certain of the law 
regarding termination, although they have vague notions 
about the possible illegality of unfair terminations. 33 Thus, 
the argument that the proposed implied term better accords 
with the intent and understanding of the parties seems 
dubious. There are, however, other reasons for setting 
default rules. Bodie argues that the modification would 
render employment at will as more justifiable. 34 While that 
29. See id. at 241,264-65. 
30. Id. at 233-34. 
31. Professor Andrew Morriss has chronicled the progressive adoption of 
employment at will by states, beginning with Maine in 1851 and Mississippi in 
1858. See generally Andrew P. Morriss, Exploding Myths: An Empirical and 
Economic Reassessment of the Rise of Employment At-Will, 59 Mo. L. REV. 679 
(1994). 
32. Indeed, Professor Bodie acknowledges in the Reporter's Notes that 
"[b]ecause it is a departure from existing law, employers might consider it to be 
a 'penalty' default[.]" RESTATEMENT OF EMP'T LAW § 7.08 reporter's note to cmt. f 
(AM. LAW INST. 2015). 
33. See Bodie, supra note 12, at 225-26,226 n.10. 
34. Id. at 226. 
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seems correct, it also suggests that the modification does not 
go far enough. Why not shift to more general just-cause 
termination? Furthermore, the at-will rule also can be 
rendered more defensible if limited by a tort theory. 
Bodie argues that the contract approach is better than a 
tort approach because "[i]t keeps contractual performance 
within the contractual sphere . . . ."13 While he sees this as 
an argument for the Restatement approach, I see it as an 
argument against it. Contract law tenets have been savagely 
distorted in the context of employment law because of the 
overwhelming strength of employment at will, and Professor 
Bodie acknowledges this. 3 6 There are numerous examples. 
Most courts require a precise form of evidence to overcome 
the at-will presumption and routinely dismiss evidence that 
would be deemed probative of most other types of contracts. 37 
The employment contract concepts of additional 
consideration and mutuality of obligation, which are often 
invoked to defeat contracts alleged to be other than at-will, 
are corruptions of traditional contract doctrine foisted on 
employment law by the need to preserve employment at 
will.38 The contract tenet most analogous to Bodie's implied 
term is the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing. 
In fact, the Restatement comments recognize that the 
proposed implied contract term is really a subset of the 
covenant of good faith and fair dealing.39 As Bodie himself 
acknowledges, that concept has virtually disappeared from 
employment law40 after a somewhat successful period in the 
1970s and 80s. 41 Simply put, contract law in the context of 
35. Id. at 264. 
36. See id. at 227-33. 
37. See id. at 229. 
38. See, e.g., Blades, supra note 24, at 1419-21; Parker, supra note 24, at 385-
89. 
39. RESTATEMENT OF EMP'T LAw § 7.08 cmt. g (Am. Law Inst. 2015). 
40. See Bodie, supra note 12, at 232-33. 
41. See, e.g., Rachel Arnow-Richman, Modifying At-Will Employment 
1080 BUFFALO LAW REVIEW [Vol. 66 
employment has been shaped, distorted, and dominated by 
employment at will, and there is no basis for thinking that 
an implied contract term will significantly change that 
state.42 
The Restatement's implied agreement draws a line 
between conduct that occurs in the context of the 
employment relationship, which is not protected, and 
conduct that has no significant impact on that relationship, 
which is protected. 43 Conduct that occurs "outside of the 
workplace" is protected if the conduct does not "refer to or 
otherwise involve the employer." 44 The workplace is defined 
in terms of location, hours, and responsibilities. 45 In the past, 
it has been common to refer to employees as having greater 
autonomy interests and employers as having less interest in 
employee activities outside the workplace. 46 Although 
historically this was a reliable demarcation for many jobs, 
the restructuring of jobs and advances in information 
technology have caused this distinction to become 
increasingly chimerical for many jobs. 4 7 Admittedly, the 
Restatement attempts to take account of these changes, 48 but 
as the workplace continues to evolve and technology 
advances, it would seem that defining the parameters of the 
workplace and scope of employment is a moving target. The 
Restatement does not protect all outside conduct, however, as 
Contracts, 57 B.C. L. REV. 427, 469-74 (2016). 
42. Professor Lawrence Blades, whose pathbreaking 1967 article proposed 
the tort of abusive discharge, considered and rejected an implied contract term 
as inefficacious in protecting employees. Blades, supra note 24, at 1421-22 
(stating "it seems reasonable to bypass the law of contracts and its unyielding 
requirement of consideration by turning to the more elastic principles of tort 
law . .. ."). 
43. RESTATEMENT OF EMP'T LAw § 7.08; see also Bodie, supra note 12, at 264. 
44. RESTATEMENT OF EMP'T LAW § 7.08 cmt. c. 
45. Id. 
46. See, e.g., WILLBORN, supra note 24, at 277-79. 
47. Professor Bodie recognizes this concern. See Bodie, supra note 12, at 266. 
48. RESTATEMENT OF EMP'T LAW § 7.08 cmt. c. 
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it exempts conduct that refers to or otherwise involves the 
employer. 49 Not only does the Restatement limit the 
protected conduct as stated, but it also provides an 
affirmative defense5 0 that employers are not liable if they can 
prove a "reasonable and good-faith belief that the employee's 
exercise of an autonomy interest interfered with the 
employer's legitimate business interests, including its 
orderly operations and reputation in the marketplace."51 
Thus, precisely what autonomy interests are protected and 
under what circumstances they are protected is a complex 
and nuanced issue. Can such a matter plausibly be depicted 
as the subject of an implied understanding? It seems that the 
complexity of the matter will foment disagreement over the 
scope of protection and considerable litigation. Moreover, the 
Restatement's limitation on protected conduct and the 
employer affirmative defense suggest that, against a 
backdrop of employment at will, courts will afford employers 
considerable deference in determining that employee 
conduct affects the employer in some way. 5 2 
Not only is the implied term beset with uncertainty, it 
also seems underinclusive. An employee may say or do things 
at work or during working hours that ought to be protected.. 
For example, if an employer permits expression of some 
political views at the workplace, I think that an employee 
should be protected in expressing contrary views at the 
49. Id. § 7.08 cmt. d. 
50. Id. § 7.08 cmt. h (statingthat § 7.08(c) is an affirmative defense). 
51. Id. § 7.08(c). The point is that employers can almost always show some 
connection between work and what an employee does or believes. Blades, supra 
note 24, at 1406. Thus, the pivotal issue should be whether the employer's 
legitimate concerns weighed against the employee's autonomy interests justify 
the interference. Id. at 1407. As will be discussed below, this balancing of 
interests is better addressed by a tort theory of recovery than by an implied 
agreement that could not credibly be said to take this balancing into account in 
advance. 
52. RESTATEMENT OF EMP'T LAW § 7.08 cmt. g (stating that employment at 
will, recognized in § 2.01, "leaves undisturbed an employer's broad discretion" to 
assess deleterious effect on work or the company's reputation). 
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workplace. In the end, it seems to me that an implied 
contract term regarding an employee's protected autonomy 
interests is complicated and amorphous, and it may not 
capture the full range of conduct that should be protected. A 
tort theory need not resolve all the nuances in advance. 
The most significant problem with the proposed implied-
contract-term approach is that it would fail to protect 
employees' autonomy interests for practical reasons. Setting 
the default in favor of employees would not prevent 
employers from taking it away from them by contract. 
Employers now routinely take rights from employees in 
boilerplate contract provisions. Most notable are mandatory 
arbitration provisions, which take the employees' right to 
litigate their claims in court (often accompanied by waivers 
of rights to pursue class or collective claims). 53 Also, 
employers use noncompete agreements to restrict employees' 
freedom to work for competitors when they separate from 
employment with the employer. There is nothing to prevent 
employers from taking the proposed implied term not to 
terminate for exercises of autonomy. So, will courts prevent 
the taking of the right by refusing to enforce such 
agreements? No. To believe that courts will not permit 
employers to do so without giving employees consideration is 
to ignore the existing examples. Will employers choose to 
leave the default presumption in place, not forcing employees 
to forfeit their autonomy rights? No. First, as Bodie 
recognizes, if a just cause rule were adopted "employers are 
in a much better position to bargain out of the default." 5 4 The 
same is true of the proposed autonomy presumption. Bodie 
argues that we should "see how employers adapt to the new 
default" before making more radical changes to employment 
at will.65 We should be able to predict reliably that employers 
will take this right as they have taken others. It is not 
53. See, e.g., Epic Sys. Corp. v. Lewis, 138 S. Ct. 1612 (2018). 
54. Bodie, supra note 12, at 263. 
55. Id. at 265-66. 
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because employers are evil; rather, they make the 
economically reasonable and efficient decisions to avoid 
regulation when they can. 
III. THE ADVANTAGES OF A TORT APPROACH 
I favor the road not taken by the Restatemen 56t -further 
development of the tort of wrongful discharge in violation of 
public policy (WDVPP) as the common law option to provide 
protection of employees' autonomy interests. There are 
numerous reasons that the tort approach is preferable. 
First, relying on the tort to protect employees' autonomy 
interests avoids the pitfalls of contract law in the 
employment context-doctrine that is dominated and 
warped by employment at will. 57 Doctrinally, courts do not 
have to accept weakening of employment at will in the realm 
of contract law to permit recovery under WDVPP."5 The tort 
does not depend upon the understandings and intentions of 
56. RESTATEMENT OF EMP'T LAw § 5.02 cmt. a (stating that the sections on 
wrongful discharge in violation of public policy "do[] not address whether 
employers engage in tortious behavior if they discharge employees for certain off-
duty conduct implicating protected privacy or autonomy interests."). 
57. See supra text accompanying notes 35-42. 
58. Admittedly, many court decisions have expressed reluctance to permit 
recovery under the WDVPP theory because of the tort's supposed infringement 
on employment at will. See, e.g., Bammert v. Don's Super Valu, Inc., 2002 WI 85, 
T 13, 254 Wis. 2d 347, 356,646 N.W.2d 365, 369-70; Wright v. Shriners Hosp. for 
Crippled Children, 589 N.E.2d 1241, 1245 (Mass. 1992). However, those decisions 
accord the at-will principle importance beyond its contract sphere of influence. 
As some commentators have explained: "[A] rule of contract law has no special 
place in the decision to recognize a tort for the abuse of a superior economic 
position in derogation of public policy .. . . Judicial preoccupation with 
employment-at-will suggests the same sort of underlying bias reflected by the 
preoccupation with privity of contract prior to the development of modern product 
liability law." WILLIAM J. HOLLOWAY & MICHAEL J. LEECH, EMPLOYMENT 
TERMINATION: RIGHTS AND REMEDIES 137 (2d ed. 1993); see also Timothy J. Coley, 
Contracts, Custom, and the Common Law: Towards a Renewed Prominence for 
Contract Law in American Wrongful Discharge Jurisprudence, 24 BYU J. PUB. 
POL'Y 193, 215 (2010) (observing that "[u]nlike the implied contract doctrine 
discussed immediately above and the implied covenant of good faith and fair 
dealing discussed below, the public policy doctrine does-not stand in such direct 
tension with contractual employment."). 
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the parties. 
A related point is that the tort approach offers a better 
prospect for acceptance by courts because it does not require 
them to subscribe to an implied contract term that almost 
certainly does not reflect the understanding of the parties. 59 
Furthermore, the tort is currently recognized by all but a few 
states;6 0 thus, this is an argument for expansion of an 
existing theory rather than recognition of an entirely new 
theory. 
A second argument in favor of the tort is that the scope 
of the protection is not limited by the amorphous and 
increasingly antiquated concept of scope of employment. 61 
Although the tort is beset by its own scope-of-coverage 
issue-defining "public policy"62-that is not an issue that is 
of diminishing relevance in modern workplaces. Courts can 
adopt more expansive approaches to defining public policy. 
The most important reason that the tort approach is 
preferable is that the tort, unlike the proposed default rule 
based on an implied understanding, cannot be divested by an 
employer's supposed bargaining-and more likely coercion. 63 
This is the paramount advantage because a protection that 
can be taken away by one party is not much protection at all. 
Professor Bodie and the Restatement present an accurate 
depiction of the tort of WDVPP in a narrowly cabined form 6 4 
as most states have adopted it. The crucial limitation is that 
59. See supra text accompanying notes 28-34. 
60. RESTATEMENT OF EMP'T LAw § 5.01 cmt. a. 
61. See supra text accompanying notes 43-52. 
62. See infra text accompanying notes 64-72. 
63. Tort law imposes duties on parties in the interest of society regardless of 
the obligations they agree to in contract. See, e.g., Michael H. Cohen, Comment, 
Reconstructing Breach of the Implied Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing 
as a Tort, 73 CALIF. L. REV. 1291,1306-07 (1985) (describingthe covenant of good 
faith and fair dealing as nonconsensual and extracontractual, and recommending 
recognition of breach of that covenant as a tort). 
64. RESTATEMENT OF EMP'T LAW §§ 5.01-5.03. 
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there must be a clearly defined public policy such that the 
termination harms not just the fired employee but also 
injures the public.6 5 Courts often decline to find a public 
policy implicated in a termination. 66 There are narrow and 
more expansive approaches to defining and identifying 
public policy,6 7 but there is no coherent view of what public 
policy means in this context and no reasoned elaboration of 
the basis for the public/private dichotomy. 68 As one court 
expressed it, "[T]he Achilles heel of [WDVPP] lies in the 
definition of public policy." 69 The public policy element and 
limitation is the principal reason that Bodie finds the tort ill-
suited to protecting employees' autonomy interests. 7 0 Yet, he 
acknowledges that the tort reminds us that employees are 
also "citizens within a larger community,"7 1 who have "social 
rights, duties, and responsibilities."72 
While the presentation of the narrow view of WDVPP is 
an accurate description of the majority approach among 
courts, and may be appropriate for a Restatement project, 
there are different views on that matter. 73 As Bodie and the 
Restatement acknowledge, there also is authority for a 
65. Bodie, supra note 12, at 250 (stating that "autonomy concerns are 
generally secondary to the primary concern: encouragement of actions that 
benefit the public"). 
66. One of the most shocking cases to deny recovery is Green v. Bryant, 887 
F. Supp. 798, 800-03 (E.D. Pa. 1995) (denying recovery to a plaintiff allegedly 
fired because she was beaten by her spouse). 
67. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT OF EMP'T LAw § 5.03; Note, Protecting Employees 
at Will Against Wrongful Discharge: The Public Policy Exception, 96 HARV. L. 
REV. 1931, 1947-48 (1983) [hereinafter Protecting Employees]. 
68. See Protecting Employees, supra note 67, at 1947-49. 
69. Palmateerv. Int'l Harvester Co., 421 N.E.2d 876, 878 (111. 1981). 
70. Bodie, supra note 12, at 259-60 (statingthat "[a]t its core ... the public-
policy tort is designed to protect public interests"). 
71. Id. at 250. 
72. Id. (quoting Palmateer, 421 N.E.2d at 878-79). 
73. See, e.g., Reuel Schiller, "It is Not Wisdom, But Authority That Makes a 
Law:" A Historical Perspective on the Problem of Creating a Restatement of 
Employment Law, 13 EMP. RTs. & EMP. POL'Y J. 39, 39-42 (2009). 
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broader version of the tort.74 In contrast to the Restatement's 
description of WDVPP, the Restatement did not adopt an 
existing and static snapshot of the law regarding the 
contractual approach it favors; the implied agreement is a 
significant modification of the existing law.7 5 Thus, I argue 
for expansion of WDVPP to protect employees' autonomy 
rights, drawing from both its origins and some of the more 
expansive development of the tort. 
The tort of WDVPP traces its origin in the United States 
to a 1959 California Court of Appeals decision, Petermann v. 
International Brotherhood of Teamsters.76 The tort gained 
academic traction and more momentum in the courts after 
Professor Lawrence Blades advocated for recognition of a tort 
of abusive discharge.77 Blades argued that the power of 
corporations had come to rival that of governments and that 
it was anomalous that the law placed restrictions on 
government action against citizens but not actions of 
corporations and other employers that result in discharge of 
employees. 78 Using the torts of abuse of process and 
intentional interference with contractual relations by a third 
party as models, combined with the underlying rationale of 
prima facie tort, Blades crafted a tort of abusive discharge. 79 
74. See RESTATEMENT OF EMP'T LAw § 5.02 cmt. h (AM. LAW INST. 2015); Bodie, 
supra note 12, at 250-51 (discussing Novosel v. Nationwide Ins. Co., 721 F.2d 
894, 898-901 (3d Cir. 1983)). 
75. See supra note 32, discussing Professor Bodie's statement in the 
Reporter's Notes to § 7.08 that the implied agreement is a change in the law. 
76. 344 P.2d 25, 26-28 (Cal. Ct. App. 1959). 
77. See Blades, supra note 24, at 1413. Professor Blades's article has been 
cited by 88 court decisions and 542 secondary sources as of October 27, 2018. 
Walter Olson declared that the article "kicked off the modern revolution in state 
employment law." Walter Olson, The Trouble With Employment Law, 8 KAN. J.L. 
& PUB. POL'Y 32, 32 (1999); see also Deborah A. Ballam, Employment-At- Will: The 
Impending Death of a Doctrine, 37 AM. Bus. L.J. 653, 659 (2000) (noting that, 
afterPetermann, courts in other states did not begin adopting WDVPP until after 
the publication of Blades's article). 
78. Blades, supra note 24, at 1404; see also Estlund, supra note 27, at 795-96 
(discussing "private government"). 
79. Blades, supra note 24, at 1423-25. 
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The proposed tort would provide a remedy when an employer 
discharges an employee in order to effectuate an ulterior 
purpose, other than that for which the right to discharge was 
designed.80 Although Blades acknowledged the argument for 
the more radical approach of extending all constitutional 
restrictions on government to private employers, he saw such 
an approach as too expansive and unnecessary if legislatures 
enacted statutes or courts developed theories to stem the tide 
of abusive discharges.s' 
The tort of WDVPP recognized today is not the broader 
abusive discharge tort envisioned by Professor Blades. 82 
Nonetheless, there have been many court decisions and 
innovations that demonstrate the capacity of the tort to 
protect employees' autonomy interests. While most courts 83 
and the Restatement84 limit the tort to four or five categories 
of fact situations, Professor Henry H. Perritt, Jr. articulated 
an elements-based approach, 85 which obviates the necessity 
of plaintiffs fitting their claims into one of the categories. 86 
80. Id. 
81. Id. at 1432 ("If contrary to this assumption, the legislatures or the courts 
proceed quickly with the task of developing other approaches, it will not be 
necessary to resort to the drastic yet inadequate step of limiting the exercise of 
private power through recourse to constitutional law."). 
82. See Kenneth A. Sprang, Beware the Toothless Tiger: A Critique of the 
Model Employment Termination Act, 43 AM. U. L. REV. 849, 868 & n.100 (1994). 
83. States usually recognize one or more of four fact patterns as actionable 
under the tort: (1) refusal to participate in illegal activity; (2) exercise of a right; 
(3) performance of a duty; or (4) reporting illegal activity (whistleblowing). MARK 
A. ROTHSTEIN ET AL., EMPLOYMENT LAw 632-47 (5th ed. 2014). 
84. RESTATEMENT OF EMP'T LAw § 5.02 (Am. Law Inst. 2015). 
85. Plaintiffs must prove (1) clear public policy; (2) discouraging plaintiffs 
conduct by termination would jeopardize the public policy; (3) the public-policy 
linked conduct caused the termination; and (4) the employer cannot offer an 
overriding justification for the termination. HENRY H. PERRITT, JR., WORKPLACE 
TORTS: RIGHTS AND LIABILITIES § 3.7 (1991). Courts in Iowa, Ohio, Washington, 
and West Virginia also have adopted this approach. See, e.g., Fitzgerald v. 
Salsbury Chem., Inc., 613 N.W.2d 275, 281 (Iowa 2000); Collins v. Rizkana, 652 
N.E.2d 653, 657-58 (Ohio 1995); Gardner v. Loomis, 913 P.2d 377, 382 (Wash. 
1996); Swears v. R.M. Roach & Sons, 696 S.E.2d 1, 6 (W. Va. 2010). 
86. There are other useful proposals to expand the tort. See, e.g., Parker, 
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One particular court decision demonstrates the potential 
of the tort theory to provide redress to employees who are 
fired for asserting their autonomy rights. The Third Circuit 
relied on Pennsylvania's tort of WDVPP to reinstate a 
plaintiffs claim that he was fired for not complying with his 
employer's requirement that he advocate for passage of a law 
by obtaining signatures on a petition addressed to the state 
legislature in Novosel v. Nationwide Insurance Co.8 7 The 
fired employee sued for wrongful discharge in violation of 
public policy. 88 The court located the public policy of free 
expression in the First Amendment of the U.S. Constitution 
and the analogous provision in the Pennsylvania 
Constitution. 89 On denial of rehearing, one judge dissented, 
noting that the majority "ignore [d] the state action 
requirement of first amendment jurisprudence."90 Following 
that reasoning, other courts have refused to find the public 
policy for the tort in the First Amendment. 91 Even the Third 
Circuit, which decided Novosel, seems to have retreated from 
that position.92 
Novosel is important because it implicates one of the 
"rights and privileges which [is] considered so important to a 
free society that [it is] constitutionally protected from 
supra note 24, at 402-04 (proposing that courts permit recovery for abusive 
discharge when the reason, if included in a contract, would result in the contract 
not being enforced). 
87. 721 F.2d 894,896 (3d Cir. 1983). 
88. Id. at 896. 
89. Id. at 899. 
90. Id. at 904 (Becker, J., dissenting from denial of rehearing); see also 
ROTHSTEIN ET AL., supra note 83, at 628 ("The United States Constitution is a 
problematic source of public policy to support a claim of wrongful discharge, 
because most federal constitutional provisions protect only against abuses of 
government power."). 
91. See Bodie, supra note 12, at 251-52; see also ROTHSTEIN ETAL., supra note 
83, at 628-29. 
92. Bodie, supra note 12, at 251 (citing Borse v. Piece Goods Shop, Inc., 963 
F.2d 611, 619-20 (3d Cir. 1992)). 
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government encroachment." 93 The expansive approach taken 
by the Third Circuit thus harkens back to Blades's urging 
that tort theory should protect employees against abusive 
discharges by employers as constitutional restrictions 
protect citizens against abusive intrusions by government. 
Although Professor Bodie sees little prospect for extension of 
Novosel,94 I see it as broadening the tort theory along the 
lines described by Professor Blades. This is appropriate 
because protecting the autonomy rights of employees, who 
are people and citizens, is important not just to the 
individuals, but to society as a whole. 95 
The tort of WDVPP, as recognized in most states today, 
does not provide adequate protection of employees' 
autonomy. There are, however, developments that 
demonstrate its capacity to fulfill this role.9 6 Professor Bodie 
argues that the balancing of employer and employee 
interests necessarily implicated by employee autonomy 
should be left in the hands of the parties via the implied 
agreement rather than entrusted to courts under the tort.97 
The record of contract law in employment and the penchant 
of employers to take rights of employees protected by only 
93. Blades, supra note 24, at 1407. 
94. Bodie, supra note 12, at 251-52. 
95. For example, Professor Samuel Bagenstos posits that protections of 
privacy and autonomy are not protections of individuals' interests alone, but also 
promote social equality as they protect a person's status as a full-fledged member 
of the community. Bagenstos, supra note 27, at 248; see also FINKIN, supra note 
11, at xxxix (asserting that autonomy and privacy play important roles in the 
formation and maintenance of self-identity and that to cease to bear such rights 
is to be dehumanized). 
96. Employers can, of course, take adverse actions against employees short of 
termination. The Restatement takes the position that constructive discharge is 
covered by the tort, but it does not take a position on extending the tort to other 
wrongful discipline. RESTATEMENT OF EMP'T LAw § 5.01 cmt. c (Am. Law Inst. 
2015). I do not advocate such expansion because courts are reluctant to oversee 
employers' personnel decisions even on the matter of termination. To subject all 
disciplinary actions to court review is to make courts super personnel boards and 
to impinge too much on employer operational prerogative. Cf. Blades, supra note 
24, at 1406. 
97. Bodie, supra note 12, at 261. 
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default rules demonstrates why the protection must be 
entrusted to courts applying tort theory. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
I commend the Restatement of Employment Law and 
Professor Bodie for seeking to move the law in the direction 
of providing greater protection of employees' autonomy 
rights. It is important for not just the individuals but also for 
our society. I also agree that developing a more robust 
common law is the appropriate road. I disagree regarding the 
better common law approach to achieve the objective. 
Contract law is the domain of employment at will. The tort 
of wrongful discharge in violation of public policy offers a 
better way around employment at will. 
